Introduction
Since the burst of the so-called "subprime" Lending in last resort aims at sustaining the financial system's overall stability The purpose was not self-evident at the time when banks like the Bank of England and the Bank of France were privately owned and competed with other banks for the business in securities trading.
Revisiting the concept of financial stability, defined as a public good, and recalling how the doctrine emerged in the midst of recurring financial crises will provide a useful theoretical underpinning to the analysis of central bank behaviour in the ongoing crisis. It will supply a yardstick to assess the many innovations devised by central banks in the course of events in the sixth months between September 2007 and March 2008. Were some technicalities necessary to adjust the implementation of the doctrine to the changing lending practices? Or were they rather breakthroughs that transform the conception of financial stability itself?
We argue in this paper that the view on the lender of last resort shall not be normative and frozen in first principles! The reason is that financial stability is a policy objective that evolves over time. In the first part of the paper we emphasize the adaptability and continuity of the lender-of-last-resort doctrine beyond the diversity of financial structures from the 19 th century to the present day. Therefore the development of new means by the central bank to better manage financial crises broadens and deepens the view on financial stability. The second part of the paper deals with the global credit crisis. We highlight that the lender of last i Emeritus Professor at the University of Paris Ouest La Défense and economics consultant at Cepii 2 resort's role is not confined to providing emergency liquidity. It aims to provide orderly deleveraging in the financial system in order to preserve the financial intermediation process.
Through the analysis of the central banks' innovative practices during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, we discuss the permanence of the lender of last resort doctrine in the current period. In conclusion we show that, since central banks have supplied direct funding liquidity to entities which were far from being commercial banks, this exposure raises a major problem. A redefinition of which financial intermediaries can be labelled "banks" and placed under the supervisory power of the central bank is a matter for future regulation.
Part 1: The principles of the lender-of-last-resort doctrine
When the historical central banks were first created, they had different functions. They were managers of the public debt. The genesis of central banks as bankers' banks took place in 19 th century England. It was closely intertwined with the conception of money. For the currency principle, enshrined in the Bank Act of 1844 that split the Bank of England's balance sheets into an issue and a banking department, the paramount function of the Bank was to enforce the convertibility of its bills into gold. However recurrent liquidity crises in 1847, 1857 and 1866 demonstrated the need for flexibility in the supply of money. The Bank Act had to be de facto suspended though not de jure.
The required flexibility in the money supply was consistent with the alternative theory of money: the banking principle. Money is a debt that financial institutions endogenously issue as a counterpart of their asset building. This definition is all-encompassing. It covers the commercial bank model whereby credits make deposits. But it also fits the investment bank model in which asset acquisition is financed via leverage in collateralized borrowing. The general feature of endogenous money creation is its procyclicality, which makes it prone to financial crises.
The general problem of the central banks' dual mandateCurrency and banking principles must be reconciled because each carries only part of the truth. The former forcefully advocates the overriding objective of anchoring the nominal unit of account. Whether via convertibility into an outside commodity (metallic standard) or via a policy rule, trust must be established in the expected long-run purchasing power of the unit of account. But with the 3 latter it must be observed that financial cycles and subsequent crises arise in credit dynamics which are not precluded by a policy uniquely dedicated to the purchasing power of money.
Financial instability became an international phenomenon with the rise of industrial capitalism. It is still very much with us.
Figures 1a and 1b display the general process of interaction in credit and asset prices that has nurtured financial crises over long periods of time. Because of the self-fulfilling nature of the process, fuelled by the mutual interaction between credit and asset prices, there is no selfadjusting market mechanism. Monetary policy only aggravated the matter by acting in a procyclical way. Left alone, the process is driven to the extreme. As its magnitude increased in the 19 th century from one business cycle to the next, more and more devastating losses plagued the depressive stage. As liquidity had dried up, more and more economic agents were pulled into the spiral of payment defaults. Despite bitter contentions and conflicts of interests, the view began to establish itself that something had to be done for the sake of the stability of the financial system as a whole. Bagehot was not a monetary theoretician. He was a practitioner and a financial journalist who acutely knew the workings of the London market. He observed that sound firms were trapped in liquidity stringency. Unable to find lenders for the cash needed to meet the payments due, they became weak links in a contagious chain of failures. There should be a lender, whose liabilities were always trustworthy, ready to lend for the sake of overall financial stability.
Such a lender could be none but the Bank of England. It ought to lend without limits to solvent but illiquid firms that could not borrow in the market because the widespread mistrust of would-be lenders dried up liquidity. Insolvent firms should be sold to new owners for what they were worth.
However this predicament required an operational principle to distinguish intrinsic insolvency from threats of failure due to liquidity stringency. Bagehot (1873) criterion compatible with the model of figure 1b. What had to be done was to manage orderly deleverage in the financial system. Therefore the quality of the collateral presented by borrowers was the distinctive criterion. Bagehot proposed to solve the problem of fair value in a crude but relevant way (there were no rating agencies providing ratings through the cycle).
Depressed market prices were of no use. The Bank of England should accept collateral at precrisis value and assess the solvency of the financial firms seeking its help by using such pricing.
Furthermore, to safeguard against moral hazard more effectively, Bagehot insisted that the central bank should lend at punitive rates. This provision would be both a risk premium for the central bank and a deterrent for borrowers. Finally central bank interventions in last resort should be kept as unpredictable as possible. This is the constructive ambiguity that central bankers are fond of, an attribute of the radical discretion that is the essence of monetary sovereignty. Lending in last resort shall not be viewed as an implicit contract, incomplete as it is. Financial stability depends entirely upon the unique character of universal and unconditional acceptance of central bank money. This is called sovereignty.
Indeed lending in last resort is an extraordinary operation that escapes market contracts providing a superior public good: the continuity of payments/settlements in the money markets, e.g. the integrity of the clearing mechanism for the whole economy. This operation allows liabilities to perpetuate, whereas they would otherwise have been destroyed by the spillover of the failed debts.
Bagehot's doctrine is therefore a paramount achievement that is still well alive today. Thus we now need to examine how the operating principles have been adjusted to the many changes that have occurred in the financial systems. Lending in last resort will always be controversial in the ethereal theoretical sphere, while not in the financial community, because its impact is twofold. On the one hand, it anticipates systemic risk because the social cost of letting insolvency spread is much higher than the private cost of the original failure. On the other hand, it can induce moral hazard if it fosters reckless behaviour against which it provides collective insurance. Stopping contagion, while keeping moral hazard at bay, was
Bagehot's purpose. The drastic change in regulation that followed, severed commercial banks from financial markets.
The difficult adoption of Bagehot's lender of last resort principle in the US
The lesson to be drawn and that was indeed drawn later, is that central bank intervention in last resort does not only provide money at critical points in time. Sometimes, with isolated incidents that threaten to become contagious, it might be sufficient. But with the damage in bank balance sheets on which the fate of other banks heavily depend emergency liquidity funding must go hand in hand with bank consolidation. And only the central bank has the ability to monitor the whole process. In doing so the central bank is encouraged to innovate in its operational modes.
With the return of financial crises in the wake of the financial systems deregulation, the lender The hedge fund finance model combines two types of leverage: a financial leverage for the different liquidity funding devices against collateral and an embedded economic leverage for the purchase of subordinated securities tranches (figure 2). In securitized markets, the financial leverage is 6 ($1.8tr assets with $300bn. capital) This leverage increased before the crisis, because hedge funds invested in leveraged products to boost their returns.
Figure 2. Double leverage on securitized credit
Leverage generates large counterparty risks between hedge funds and prime brokers ( figure   3 ).
Figure 3. Counterparty risk
In good times, hedge funds use leverage aggressively to invest in more and more risky assets.
They get the best price for their borrowing in making the most of the competitive market for prime brokerage. In bad times, hedge funds are very sensitive to the lack of liquidity resulting from their porfolios' declining value. The more hedge funds engage in leverage, the more of their liquid assets they must sell to provision their losses on the illiquid assets in stressful markets. This type of behaviour spreads distress from one market to another. Figure 4 illustrates the leverage destabilizing mechanism. As much as securitized assets have been downgraded, the plummeting value in the portfolio of assets raises counterparty risks.
Prime brokers impose higher margins (hair cut) triggering double deleveraging: first for the decline in asset value, second for the higher margin. Let us consider a hypothetical hedge fund leveraged at 4 times the cash invested by its clients and that prime brokers do not want to or cannot provide financing at a higher leverage ratio. If the value of the hedge fund's portfolio were to decline by 5%, the hedge fund would have to sell 25% of assets to maintain a leverage ratio of 4. Furthermore, if prime brokers impose a leverage of 3 instead of 4, the hedge fund would have to sell 40% of assets. All market participants know these new interrelationships between market illiquidity and funding illiquidity iii and the blurred frontier between illiquidity and insolvency in a marketbased financial system. This common knowledge largely explains the new characteristics of the liquidity crisis which gives to uncertainty -in the Knightian sense -a crucial role.
In Summer 2007, despite the small size of the US sub-prime mortgage sector relative to the world financial system, its difficulties led to disruptive developments in many financial market segments the world over. One major surprise was the amplitude and rapidity of the transmission to the very core of the financial system, e.g. the inter-bank market. The heart of this crisis is a rise in uncertainty -unknown and non-measurable risk. The financial instruments and derivative structure underpinning the recent growth in credit markets, are complex and difficult to evaluate. The growing uncertainty surrounding the valuation of structured credit instruments affected their liquidity and caused difficulties in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) the shadow banks issue to fund their CDO holdings. Widespread uncertainty about the distribution of exposure to sub-prime losses across financial institutions made it impossible to distinguish sound from unsound financial institutions, then leading financial institutions to refuse to provide funding to each other due to concerns over counterparty credit risk. The fear that some yet to be identified institutions might next reveal large exposure to sub-prime made banks sceptical about the creditworthiness of any financial institution, especially those with the greatest willingness to borrow in money markets. So we were faced with a typical "lemons" problem.
On August 9 th , BNP Paribas announced that the quotation of three of its funds needed to be suspended and that it would freeze withdrawals from them, stating that illiquidity in the respective markets prevented it from valuing assets. This announcement was a powerful market trigger. The inter-bank market came under extreme strain, Europe's overnight interest rate spiked and financial institutions started to hoard term liquidity, simultaneously causing a gridlock in funding markets. Central banks immediately supplied very large quantities of reserves in response to pressing bank demand.
The disruptions in inter-bank trading were compounded by the banks' uncertainty about their own liquidity needs. It is an unusual crisis because it is not related to a quantitative lack of liquidity, rather to a concern about the availability of funding to meet prospective future
iii Funding illiquidity occurs when solvent financial institutions have difficulty borrowing immediate means of payment to meet liabilities falling due. actions to the specificity of this crisis. This last point will be the next focus in our analysis.
The central banks' innovative initiatives
Because of the specific nature of the financial distress, central banks' tools and practices were renewed and adapted during the crisis. The adaptation process engaged by each central bank was conditioned by the operating frameworks they have in place (Borio C. and Nelson W, 2008) . Monetary operating frameworks establish the means by which central banks implement their desired monetary policy stance. It includes the rate policy which signals the desired policy stance, the liquidity management operations with a key distinction between discretionary operations and standing facilities (lending and deposit facilities), the maturity and frequency of discretionary operations, the counterparty arrangements and the range of eligible collateral. All these components of the monetary operating frameworks may vary considerably from country to country. So, the need for innovations in the central banks' tools and practices largely depends on the existing monetary operational framework. For instance, counterparty arrangements differ largely among countries. In the euro area as well as in Australia and Switzerland, the range of eligible counterparties is very broad and common across operations. At the other end of the spectrum, in the United States and to a lesser extent in Canada, the set of counterparties for discretionary operations is considerably smaller than that with access to standing facilities. Such significant differences in the domestic monetary operational device largely explain the differences in the lender-of-last-resort innovations needed to respond to the specificity of the inter-bank market crisis. Nevertheless, central bank interventions to alleviate the recent financial turmoil exhibit large similarities.
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The first challenge faced by central banks was the changing maturity composition in banks' net demand for funding liquidity with an increase in the net demand for term funding relative to overnight funding. This phenomenon was partly due to the large scale reintermediation of conduits. Indeed, during the market crisis, some market participants purchased assets from or extended credit to the off-balance sheet vehicles that they had created and the money market funds that they managed even though they had no contractual obligation to do so (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, April 2008). Such decisions might reflect reputation concerns, but mainly the counterparty risk involved in a disorderly deleveraging of the conduits. The need for longer financial assistance resulted from this reintermediation process.
To a varying degree, all central banks increased the availability of term funding supplied to the market through discretionary operations. it involves all of the over 7000 commercial banks in the country rather than just the 20 primary dealers and the collateral accepted is much broader v than with the standard repo. It also differs from the discount window because it offers anonymity to the bidders and so it did not carry any stigma. Moreover, the TAF rules allow banks to pledge collateral that might otherwise have very low market value. According to S. Cecchetti (2008) , with the TAF, the Fed is taking collateral at a price that is almost certainly above what the banks could get for it anywhere else.
Because of a lack of confidence in the assets created from the securitization of bank loans, more especially mortgage-backed securities, it has become very difficult for banks to exchange these assets for cash. Banks have on their balance sheets an "overhang" of these assets that they cannot readily sell or use to secure borrowing. This overhang has created uncertainty about the banks' financial position. As a result, they have been reluctant to lend even to each other. So, the illiquidity of certain class of securities and in some cases the disappearance of the market they are traded in, is the main cause of the funding problem faced by banks. Moreover, worsened by the mark-to-market accounting principle, the solvency of financial institutions was also threatened by market illiquidity. In order to tackle these serious funding and solvency problems, central banks worldwide have extended their lending facilities but also widened the range of collateral accepted for their operations. They also created new tools to finance part of the overhang of illiquid assets by exchanging them temporarily with more easily tradable assets. The banks could then use these liquid assets to finance themselves more normally. The Fed and the Bank of England became involved in such innovative practices whose aims are to improve the liquidity position of the banking system and enhance confidence in financial markets. which is similar to that for the discount window.
By allowing the primary dealers to temporarily swap illiquid assets such as MBS for highly liquid Treasuries "the TSLF intends to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral and thus foster the functioning of financial markets more generally" vii .
With this extension of the Fed's long-standing securities lending program, it is expected that, if primary dealers can exchange MBS for Treasury bills through TSLF, then traders and asset managers would be less reluctant to hold them back again. As reported by S Cecchetti (2008) -"The assets swaps will be for long terms. Each swap will be for a period of one year and may be renewed for a total of up to three years.
-The risk of losses on their loans remains with the banks.
-The swaps are available only for assets existing at the end of 2007 and cannot be used to finance new lending."
Under theses swap arrangements, the banks remain the owner of the illiquid assets they offer to the Bank of England. When a swap transaction ends, the assets are handed back to the banks in exchange for the return of the Treasury bills.
In a briefing note providing information about the purpose and nature of this initiative, the Bank of England explains: "Banks will be required to pay a fee to borrow the treasury bills.
The fee charged will be the spread between the 3-month London Interbank interest rate swap arrangement, and if the assets pledged as security were to be downgraded, the banks would need to replace them with other highly-rated assets.
With such provision, the Bank of England seems largely protected against credit risk.
Nevertheless, the Bank of England bears the risk of joint default by the borrowing bank and the issuer of the illiquid assets. The probability of such joint-default is not equal to zero because MBS backed by mortgage originated by the bank offering the MBS to the bank of England in the SLS or by a corporate belonging to the same financial conglomerate are not forbidden.
On March either discount window borrowing or the TAF which were both restricted to regulated depository institutions. This program is also authorized under paragraph 3 of section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act which allows lending to non-banks under "exigent and unusual circumstances". Such provision suggests that there is a fundamental difference between PDCF and the Fed's normal operations. Indeed, the privileges for banks that come from belonging to the Federal Reserve System -access to emergency liquidity -come with regulation costs so that banks with direct access to Fed credit do not take excessive risks. Yet, although the primary dealers are subject to capital requirements, they do not fall under the same constraining regulatory framework as the banks. Stearns was about to file for bankruptcy protection, the Fed did not allow it to do so. For the first time ever, it decided to lend directly to an investment bank. It triggered the immediate expectation that the whole investment banking profession had been placed under the Fed's franchise. This belief was confirmed by the PDCF that extends the umbrella of the lender of last resort to the entire investment banking industry. The Fed removed from the market the awesome belief that a rolling collapse of the biggest investment banks had become a real possibility. The long-run consequences of such a landmark in bank regulation have yet to be drawn. However, in the short run, it has had noticeable effects
The cost of insuring against default through credit default swaps is directly expressed as a spread over the rates on similar treasury bonds. Higher spreads mean higher effective insurance premiums. This is a basic measure of stress in the credit markets as a whole. Figure   6 depicts the spread.
23 Even the heavy Fed's reaction at the end of January only had a very short-run effect. The spread culminated with the Bear Stearns's demise. Since the Fed's dramatic decision the spread has substantially receded, though it stays at a very high level compared to the pre-crisis situation.
Another indicator probes into the turmoil on the interbank money market. This is the 3-month LIBOR spread over treasury bills of the same maturity , the so-called TED spread (figure 4) The relationship changed completely while capital problems had become paramount from July 2008 on. The Fed has extended more liquidity and for longer than before, but it has become the arm of the Treasury in much more complex rescue packages. The stake of emergency plans turned to nationalising de facto too big or too connected financial institutions. However from the GSEs to AIG, the policy was still reactive and piecemeal.
Nonetheless while interbank markets seized entirely and world Stock markets slumped altogether on September 18, Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke were convinced that a decisive action was needed. They proposed a threefold plan: a giant public resolution fund to buy bad debts, an unlimited credit lines to money market funds granted by the Fed under a blanket Treasury guarantee, an interdiction of short selling in the Stock market.. Therefore crisis management has become global and strategic. It opens the way to regulatory and supervisory reform, whereby the Federal Reserve will be granted much extended power over a larger banking system, encompassing investment banks and interconnected shadow 26 banks. The Fed is studying ways and means of countercyclical macro prudential policy to complement monetary policy in pursuing the dual objective of financial stability and price stability.
